To what extent will President Pujol's self-confessed tax evasion affect the independence process in Catalonia? According to Spain and the unionist camp, a great deal. Their conclusion, which seeks to undermine the "ethical superiority" of the pro-independence movement (as stated by José Antonio Zarzalejos this last Sunday), rests on two steps. The first one consists of claiming that "pujolism" (which they now have chosen to identify with catalanism, after having repeatedly claimed otherwise) is the father of the independence process and that, as a result, the latter has all the markings and flaws of the former president. The second part argues that, in the event of a hypothetical independence and without Spain's oversight, Catalonia would become a mafia republic run by mini-Berlusconis and mini-Sarkozys.
The public commotion caused by president Pujol's self-confession is the best proof of political stature and his decisive role in defining and leading the catalanist movement in the last quarter of the 20th century. Jordi Pujol interpreted the Catalan public opinion (with all its desires, as well as its fears) and understood Spain (with all its dark places) in a way that few Catalan politicians did before. On this ability to perceive both the Catalan mentality and the Spanish realpolitik of his time, Pujol built a rather effective government programme, at least until the mid-90s, with some elements that are still with us: a policy of appeasement towards Spain (which cost the princely sum of our fiscal deficit) and another of peninsular modernisation (trough the integration into the EU and the euro) that allowed time to the winners and losers of the Civil War and to the new immigration to blend culturally in Catalonia (as encapsulated by the slogan "We are 6 million" he helped to coin) and to build some autonomous political institutions (education, radio, tv and the Catalan police force).
However, it is also true that Pujol's leadership, his skillful management of the two capital sins of Catalans in the 20th century (a strong revolutionary iimpulse followed by some sort of bourgeois, almost epicurean aloofness toward anything political) and his capacity to build government action waned and, eventually, disintegrated at the turn of the century. The Spanish right, at last rebuilt after a long Transition (1) in the desert, left him no room to manoeuvre in Spain. The Catalan left, having lost the political leadership of catalanism during the Transition, joined forces behind Pasqual Maragall's federalist project and finally took over. And, in particular, it was the passing of time that kept widening the gap between Jordi Pujol's generation (the one of the early post-war, who found consolation in work and private life from the defeat of the war) and the younger generations who neither participated in the resistance movement of the 1960s (Pujol's greatest nemesis) nor voted in the Spanish constitution of 1978. For all these reasons, concluding that the independence movement is a new reincarnation of "pujolism" seems a groundless accusation. As a matter of fact, it is (or it hopes to be) the complete opposite: the emancipation from the Spanish regional corset.
The second part of the argument (that Spain acts as an independent guardian of a Sicilian Catalonia) is equally hollow. Spain is incapable of offering regeneration: in terms of judicial independence and corruption, Spain's worldwide ranking is deplorable. And the anti-system alternative presented by the political movement Podemos contains ninety-nine per cent of populist "chavismo" and only one per cent of the kind of north European social liberalism that is needed.
However, the fact that Spanish nationalism has little credibility does not mean that president Pujol's tax evasion isn't damaging. It disappoints the (generally older) catalanist voters that he had inspired to embrace Catalan independence and torpedoes the government coalition that is tasked with the burden of preparing the referendum. For now (and in the foreseeable future), CiU is indispensable for the process to come to fruition. Historically, without the moderate political centre every great attempt at political transformation in Catalonia has failed. Therefore, the only solution is to clean up the two parties that form the coalition thoroughly.
In any case, this call to regeneration and cleansing is applicable to all political parties in Catalonia. As voters, we are tired of politicians waving somebody else's dirty laundry to dodge their own responsibilities. But, make no mistake, we are equally tired of those who are quick to talk about "new politics" (with actors who claim moral superiority) against the so-called "old politics" in order to justify trading sinecures. Politics will always be politics, with its share of black holes and sinister practices. All we can do is try to tame it. This will require cutting down the weight of the real estate and tourism economy (and all the licenses and permits it generates) and putting an end to the institutional opacity of the current rules of the game (introducing term limits, zero press subsidies, public prosecutors elected by the people and judges who are free from the executive branch).
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1 N.T. In Spain’s contemporary history, the Transition refers to the period following Franco’s death when Spain’s dictatorial regime turned into a largely democratic one, albeit initially under the watchful eye of the military and the ruling elite.
