"Give me a lever long enough and a fulcrum on which to place it, and I shall move the world" (Archimedes of Syracuse, 3rd century BC)

1. Dialogue. Mariano Rajoy and Artur Mas will finally meet in the Moncloa palace to talk about the process. Neither of the two believes in it, but neither of them can allow himself to appear as an obstacle to dialogue. This meeting is the first victory for the supporters of the third way and evidence that the process has managed to move Madrid off of its impassivity: within the government, more voices than just the Minister of Exterior are being heard, they are presenting manifestos and bringing more Spanish police officers to Catalonia.

2. The economy. It is improving slowly, but in Catalonia more rapidly than elsewhere. Investors, both in industry and real estate, appear to be anything but scared, and the sale of CatalunyaBanc, with its headquarters in Catalonia, will have some bidders. As there is nothing scarier than a million dollars, those who are prone to scaremongering are left to argue that what is happening is that the scenario of independence has no credibility. Nor is there evidence in Scotland of withdrawal of investment capital, despite the threat there too that the independence process will lead to automatic exclusion from the European Union. Time is in favor of independence, as its primary vulnerability is fear of the unknown, and the unknown is becoming less so as the parties begin to talk.

3. What happens the day after? Nothing will happen the day after (the consultation, the declaration of independence, etc): Spain will say that it doesn't have any legal validity, foreign nations will remain silent, Catalans will continue paying taxes--directly or indirectly-- to the Tax Revenue Agency, and businesses will continue to operate. This makes the prophets of apocalypse nervous, because it leaves them without an argument, and the independence supporters as well, because everything that they want to do will appear to be for naught. The process cannot have a swift resolution.

4. Metaphors. Metaphors help us to understand new concepts, but because they don't apply perfectly they give a distorted impression. Few metaphors are less appropriate than that of the head-on train collision, which invokes violence and bodies moving at high speed. In reality, one of the bodies is moving very slowly ("We will prepare a lot of reports", "We will negotiate a date and question", "We will request the devolution of another matter", "We will pass a law", "We will have a consultation", "We'll see what happens afterwards...") while the other side isn't moving at all. And as for violence, neither side can resort to it. There won't be anything like a train collision. The strategy for independence consists in forcing things to the point of making the Spanish state choose between the status quo and democracy. It is the strategy of the weak, but it is infallible, if maintained for long enough. The State's strategy is to wait for the independence movement to tire, to split apart, or to lose legitimacy through some violent action. Meanwhile, its weapon is to invoke the current legality: they will not authorize anything, nor recognize anything; they will challenge everything, but not suppress anything that is done peacefully, as that would compromise their own prestige. The weapon of the independence movement is peaceful mobilization and the vote, again and again. As the process progresses it is becoming clear that it isn't just a long-distance race, it's a marathon. The challenge for the independence forces is to maintain discipline over such a long time.

5. Discipline. What will Mas do if the law of consultations is struck down by the Constitutional Court? Mas didn't say that we will vote on 9 November, only that he will call a consultation. He added that he would not break any laws. Either Rajoy will agree, or clearly we won't vote on that date. Will there be dissension among the proponents of the vote? It seems not: in view of the coming scenario, Forcadell stated that "The ANC will support any proposal that the Catalan Parliament makes in the case that the consultation planned for 9 November doesn't take place" (30/6/14).

6. The outcome. If the independence movement tires, splits apart, or loses legitimacy, the State will have won without breaking a sweat. If they hold together, the dilemma between status quo and democracy will end up being unbearable, and the State will yield. They will have to propose something that the Catalans can vote for, and the supporters of independence will have to accept the results of the voting, which might not be independence but could be something resembling it. The problem for the State is that, with this option always available, the longer it takes to propose it, the more they will have to offer to beat the independence option, as the apocalyptic threat will lose credibility over time, and the emotional disconnection of many Catalans is becoming more pronounced. It is unlikely that the State will lose completely, but time is not on its side.